The National Resident Matching program strives for a stable matching of medical students to teaching hospitals. With the presence of couples, stable matchings need not exist. For any student preferences, we show that each instance of a stable matching problem has a 'nearby' instance with a stable matching. The nearby instance is obtained by perturbing the capacities of the hospitals. Specifically, given a reported capacity k h for each hospital h, we find a redistribution of the slot capacities k h sat-
Introduction
The problem of finding a stable matching was introduced by Gale and Shapley [1962] who also identified a setting where such matchings always exist. Since then, matching theory has become a central topic of market design, and changed the way centralized markets such as medical matching and school choice are organized. Motivated by these applications, there has been a flood of work, including Fleiner [2003] , Hatfield and Milgrom [2005] , Ostrovsky [2008] and Hatfield and Kojima [2010] , enlarging the settings in which a stable matching is certain degree of heterogeneity. Moreover, the results in Kojima et al. [2013] and Ashlagi et al. [2014] hold only when the proportion of couples approaches 0 as the market gets large.
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In this paper we propose an alternative measure of closeness to stability motivated by Budish [2011] and Dean et al. [2006] . Specifically, how many additional resources must be added or removed to ensure the existence of a stable matching? In the context of the NRMP this would be how many additional residency slots are needed to ensure the existence of a stable matching? The answer is at most 9, independent of the number of hospital slots and medical school graduates. Importantly, unlike Kojima et al. [2013] our answer to this question does not rely on restrictions on the proportions of couples, probabilistic assumptions about doctor's preferences or asymptotic arguments.
Our result applies to settings more general than the NRMP. To describe them, label one side of a two-sided market, supply (teaching hospitals, schools) and the other demand (medical students, school students). The supply side has capacity constraints. A matching is feasible if the supply of each agent on the supply side is allocated to the demand side so as to comply with the constraints of the application without exceeding its capacity. Call a matching α-feasible if the supply of each agent on the supply side allocated to the demand side differs (up or down) from its capacity by at most α.
The contribution of this paper is to establish the existence of near feasible stable matchings when preferences on the demand side exhibit a limited degree of complementarity. The degree of complementarity in preferences is measured by a parameter α. Given α, we establish the existence of a (2α − 1)-feasible stable matching. We also give an algorithm for identifying it. In the context of the NRMP with couples, α = 2. Our result implies a stable matching in which each hospital is assigned a number of residents that differs from its reported capacity by at most 3. This seems like a small additional number of positions to lay on or do without. Every additional resident, according to the AMA costs a hospital about $100,000 on average of which 40% is covered by the US government.
4 Thus, it is unlikely that any one hospital will be willing to spend the money to increase its capacity or suffer a reduction to ensure stability. However, the total number of residencies and their distribution is determined by the Federal government (via formulae of various kinds). One might speculate that, if in total, the extra number of positions needed is small, it might be willing to spend for it. Hence, our next result. There is a 4-feasible stable matching such that in total, across all hospitals, we do not reduce the number of slots and the additional number of slots needed is at most 9. As the total number of first year residency positions in the US is presently around 30,000, an additional 9 slots, is, in the aggregate, a small proportion of the total.
The technique used to arrive at the result is a combination of Scarf's lemma (Scarf [1967] ) and a combinatorial optimization method, called iterative rounding, developed in Lau et al.
[2011] and Nguyen et al. [2014] . Both Scarf's lemma and iterative rounding are constructive, therefore, the near feasible matches we identify can be obtained by a finite time algorithm.
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In the following, we first discuss the related literature, then, rather than describe the most general setting in which the technique applies, we begin in Section 2, for expositional purposes, by considering the stable matching problem with couples. In Section 3 we introduce a more general model, that might be useful in the context of matching with contracts, and prove the main results. Section 4 further extends our results to a broader class of choice functions. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are given in the Appendix.
4 These numbers are from an AMA pamphlet in support of the current approach to funding residency programs. http://savegme.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ graduate-medical-education-action-kit. 2-3.pdf 5 Our approach though constructive does rely on Scarf's lemma which is known to be PPAD complete, Kintali [2008] . Thus, it has a worst-case complexity equivalent to that of computing a fixed point. We do not see this as an obvious barrier to implementation. For example, building on Budish [2011] , a course allocation scheme that relies on a fixed point computation has been proposed and implemented at the Wharton School. Roth [1984] is one of the first papers to consider complementarities in matching problems.
Related work
That paper shows non-existence of a stable matching when some agents are couples. Subsequently, the design of matching in the presence of complementarities has become an important topic. See Biró and Klijn [2013] for a brief survey. The literature has focused on the couples setting and taken three approaches to circumventing the problem of non-existence.
The first, is by imposing restrictions on the preferences of the agents to ensure existence of a stable matching. Examples of this are Cantala [2004] , Klaus and Klijn [2005] , Pycia [2012] and Sethuraman et al. [2006] . These restrictions impose some kind of strong alignment in agent preferences. In Klaus and Klijn [2005] , for example, which focuses on matchings with couples, it is assumed that a unilateral improvement of one partners job is considered beneficial for the couple as well.
6 Cantala [2004] and Sethuraman et al. [2006] consider an alternative restriction motivated by geographical considerations (couples prefer to be in close proximity to each other).
The second is to argue that instances of non-existence are rare in large markets. For example, Kojima et al. [2013] , Ashlagi et al. [2014] and Che et al. [2014] consider large (in some cases the continuum), random markets, where agent's preference are independently drawn from a distribution and the fraction of couples compared with the size of the market approaches zero. They prove that a stable matching exists with high probability in these environments. The assumption that couples form a vanishing proportion of the population is crucial as Ashlagi et al. [2014] show that the result does not hold when the fraction of couples is a constant.
The third approach is to 'ignore' the indivisibility of agents, identify and provide interpretations of 'fractional' stable matchings. Examples are Dean et al. [2006] , Aharoni and Holzman [1998] , Aharoni and Fleiner [2003] , Király and Pap [2008] and Biro and Fleiner [2012] . Dean et al. [2006] , for instance, examines a machine scheduling problem that em-6 See also the bilateral substitutes condition of Hatfield and Kojima [2010] .
beds, as a special case, a restricted instance of the stable matching problem with couples. In that instance, couples prefer to be together rather than apart and a hospital cannot accept just one member of the couple. Under these conditions they show how to find a 2-feasible stable matching. The remaining papers we cite, establish the existence of a fractional stable matching via Scarf's lemma Scarf [1967] . Biró et al. [2013] reports on numerical experiments that show in many cases the fractional solutions obtained from Scarf's lemma are actually integral and thus are stable matchings.
This paper builds on the technique of Lau et al. [2011] to show how to round the fractional stable matchings returned by Scarf's lemma into integral stable matchings that are near feasible. The degree of infeasibility in these stable matchings depends, as noted earlier, on the degree of complementarity exhibited in the preferences of one side of the market. Our approach extends beyond matching with couples to include the general setting of multilateral matching with contracts.
Matching with Couples
To fix ideas we begin with a description of the standard matching model with couples, that is studied, for example, in Roth [1984] and Kojima et al. [2013] . Let H be the set of hospitals, D 1 the set of single medical graduates (who are doctors) and D 2 the set of couples. Each couple c ∈ D 2 is denoted by c = (f, m). For each couple c ∈ D 2 we denote by f c and m c the first and second member of c. The set of all doctors, D is given by 
A matching µ in this model describes an assignment of each single doctor to a hospital or his/her outside option, an assignment of couples to at most two positions (in the same or different hospitals) or their outside option, and such that the total number of doctors assigned to any hospital h does not exceed its capacity k h . Given matching µ, let µ h denote the subset of doctors matched to h; µ s and µ fc , µ mc denote the position(s) that the single doctor s, and the female member, the male member of the couple c obtain in the matching, respectively.
We say µ is individual rational if ch h (µ h ) = µ h for any hospital h; µ s s ∅ for any
We list the the ways in which different small coalitions can block a matching µ.
Given preference lists for single doctors and couples; a matching µ is stable with respect to a capacity vector k if under the responsive choice functions of hospitals defined above, µ is individually rational and cannot be blocked in any of the three ways listed above. 
Under Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 it is possible for a hospital to be assigned fewer doctors than its reported capacity. However, the condition h∈H k h ≤ h∈H k h , ensures that in aggregate the matching does not 'burn' positions to ensure stability.
We delay the proofs of Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 to the next section, where we derive more general results.
7 If we are not permitted to decrease the number of slots in each hospital, we can apply Theorem 2.1 to the capacities k * h := k h + 3. In this case we obtain k satisfying |k * h − k h | ≤ 3, which implies k h ≤ k h ≤ k h + 6, such that a stable matching with respect to k exists.
Matching with Complementaries
We now generalize the couples models. Let A, B represent the sets of agents on the demand and supply side of the market respectively. Associated with each b ∈ B is a capacity k b . We allow each agent a ∈ A to 'consume' a bundle of agents in B. In the context of matching with couples, A would represent the set of doctors and B the set of hospitals. A single doctor a ∈ A is interested in consuming bundles of agents in B of size at most 1. A couple in A, however is interested in consuming a bundle of size 2, either 2 copies of the same agent in B or two distinct agents in B.
Denote by N |B| the set of bundles. Any set containing multiple copies of different agents in B is considered to be a bundle. For each S ∈ N |B| , let S b denote the number of copies of b ∈ B contained in S. The size of a bundle S is denoted size(S) and size(S) = b∈B S b .
Given a ∈ A and S ∈ N |B| , denote by F a,S the finite set of possible ways in which agent a can consume the bundle S. In the matching with couples context, suppose a is a couple and S consists of one copy each of a pair of hospitals. Then, F a,S denotes all possible ways in which each member of the couple a can be assigned to exactly one of the hospitals in S. A matching in this general environment will assign to each a ∈ A a pair (f, S) where S ∈ N |B| and f ∈ F a,S . More generally, one can think of F a,S as a set of possible contracts between a ∈ A and the agents in B that provide resources to form the bundle S, i.e, {b ∈ B|S b > 0}.
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For each agent a ∈ A let S a be the set of feasible bundles that a can be assigned to and let a be her strict preference ordering over {f, S}; where S ∈ S a ; f ∈ F a,S . We assume agent a prefers any of the triples in S a to her outside option.
Notice that the formulation above imposes no restriction on the degree of complementarity that agent a's preferences can exhibit. We now restrict it by assuming that each a ∈ A is only interested in bundles of size at most α. In the couples example, α = 2. In other words, the set of feasible bundles S a only contains bundles of size at most α.
Let Φ denote the set of all triples, i.e.,
Given H ⊂ Φ, let H a = {(a, f, S) : (a, f, S) ∈ H}, that is, H a contains all triples in H that involve a. Similarly, for each agent b ∈ B, let H b be the set of all triples whose bundle contains at least one good owned by b, i.e.,
} is the set of all triples involving a, and
is the set of all triples involving b.
returns a subset of H (that does not violate b's capacity constraint) representing b's choice when the elements in H are available.
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Definition 3.1 A set of triples M ⊂ Φ is a feasible matching with respect to k if |M a | ≤ 1 for each agent a ∈ A and and for every b ∈ B the matching M does not allocate more than k b copies of agent b to agents in A, i.e.,
The following is the analog of blocking introduced in Section 2.
A feasible matching M is stable if the following hold:
9 We will introduce a specific class of choice function that we consider in this section in Definition 3.4.
2)[No blocking] It is not blocked by any triple.
A stable matching is robust to blocking by a single triple, that is a single agent a ∈ A and a coalition of agents in B. One might also wish to consider the possibility of blocking by subsets of triples.
Definition 3.3 Given a feasible matching M, a nonempty, disjoint set of triples H ⊂ Φ are said to be a blocking coalition of M if the following hold:
A feasible matching M is group-stable if the following hold:
There does not exist a blocking coalition H.
As in the case of couples, by limiting the preferences of agents in B we can restrict attention to blocking by smaller coalitions. In the remainder of this section we restrict to the class of choice function we call generalized responsive. Notice that CH b allows b ∈ B to express preferences over what agents b ∈ B an agent a is matched to. Under generalized responsive preferences, if a matching is not blocked by any one triple, it is not blocked by any coalition of triples. This property follows directly from the definitions above, thus, we have the following claim.
10 In Section 4 we show that the results of this section continue to hold for a much larger class of preferences. Proof. Assume M is stable, but not group-stable. Then, there exists a blocking coalition, H disjoint from M. Let (a, f, S) ∈ H, we have:
This shows that (a, f, S) blocks M, contradicting the stability of M. • If a is a single doctor and S a single position in hospital b, then, f is redundant and taken to be a NULL element. Set (a, f, S)| b := a.
• If a represents a couple and S a bundle that contains 1 position at hospital b and 1 position at hospital b , then, f represents which member of the couple is assigned to b and b . Let (a, f, S)| b be the member assigned to b .
• If a represents a couple and S a bundle that contains 2 positions at hospital b, then f is redundant and is taken to be a NULL element. Among the two members of a, let (a, f, S)| b denote the lower ranked of the pair according to b's priority ordering b .
We extend the ordering b over doctors to an ordering * b over triples (a, f, S) ∈ Φ b as follows: given two triples (a, f, S),
However, here it is possible that indifference occur when we combine the two members. In this case we will use the preference of the couple to break tie.
Under this priority ordering, we obtain the following result.
Claim 3.2 (Biró et al. [2013] ) Let M be a stable matching with respect to the priority ordering { * b } b∈B . Then, M is stable in the couples problem with respect to the ordering { b } b∈B .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The converse of Lemma 3.2 is false in the sense that a matching stable with respect { b } b∈B need not be stable with respect to { * b } b∈B .
Existence of Near Feasible Stable Matches
In the remainder of this section we show the existence of near feasible stable matches. Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose each agent b ∈ B has generalized responsive preferences, and each agent a ∈ A is interested in bundles of size at most α. For any capacity vector {k b |b ∈ B} the following are true:
• There exists a capacity vector {k b |b ∈ B} satisfying max b∈B |k b −k b | ≤ 2α − 1 and b∈B k b ≤ b∈Bk b , such that a stable matching with respect tok exists.
• There exists a capacity vector {k b |b ∈ B} satisfying max b∈B |k b −k b | ≤ 2α and b∈B k b ≤ b∈Bk b ≤ b∈B k b + (2α + 1)α − 1 such that a stable matching with respect tok exists.
Moreover, the near feasible matches identified above can be determined by a finite time algorithm. Remark. In some applications, the agents in B (i.e. hospitals) are partitioned into different classes that may represent different regions and their regional capacity constraints in addition to capacity constraints for each b ∈ B.
11 The proof of Theorem 3.1 extends to this case.
Namely, if there is a partition of B in to regions, then there is a stable matching that allocates at most (2α + 1)α − 1 items more than the total reported capacity in each region.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 employs Scarf's lemma. To state the lemma we need the following definition.
Definition 3.5 Let Q be an n × m nonnegative matrix and r ∈ R n + . Denote P = {x ∈ R m + :
Qx ≤ r}. Associated with each row i ∈ [n] of Q is a strict order i over the set of columns j for which q i,j > 0. A vector x ∈ P dominates column j if there exists a row i such that
such that q i,k > 0 and x k > 0. Here q i represents the i th row of matrix Q. In this case, we also say x dominates column j at row i.
We use the following version of Scarf's lemma due to Király and Pap [2008] :
Lemma 3.1 (Scarf [1967] ) Let Q be an n × m nonnegative matrix, r ∈ R n + and P = {x ∈ R m + : Qx ≤ r}. Then, P has a vertex that dominates every column of Q.
To apply Scarf's lemma we require a linear inequality representation of the set of matchings M. Let x a,f,S = 1 if the bundle S is assigned to a according to f ∈ F a,S and zero otherwise. To ensure each agent a is assigned at most one bundle:
x a,f,S ≤ 1 for every agent a ∈ A.
To ensure we satisfy b's capacity constraint:
Now, relax the condition that x a,f,S ∈ {0, 1} to x a,f,S ≥ 0 and let Qx ≤ r be the matrix representation of (2) and (1). Notice, each row corresponds to an element of A ∪ B and each column of Q corresponds to a triple (a, f, S). Each row a ∈ A orders the columns (a, f, S) according to a . Each a ∈ B orders the columns (a, f, S) according to the priority ordering * b .
According to Lemma 3.1 there exists a vertex x * ≥ 0 that dominates all columns of Q.
Thus, for every triple (a 0 , f 0 , S 0 ), at least one of the following is true:
2. There exists b ∈ B, such that S 0 contain at least one copy of b (i.e, S 0 b ≥ 1) and
Furthermore, b assigns weakly higher priority to all triples (a, f, S) ∈ Φ b such that
Therefore, if x * is an integral vector, then, x * is a stable matching because the conditions above rule out a blocking triple (a 0 , f 0 , S 0 ). Unfortunately, the polytope defined by (1) and (2) is not integral. We take advantage of x * 's structure to construct a near feasible stable matching. The following observation is important for our results.
Lemma 3.2 Let x * ∈ P dominate every column of Q. Letx be a {0, 1} vector whose support is a subset of x * 's support, i.e, x * a,f,S = 0 ⇒x a,f,S = 0, such that
Letk be the following capacity vector
Then,x is a stable matching with respect tok.
Proof. First of all,x is a feasible matching with respect tok. Next, using the fact that x * dominates all columns of Q, we show that under the new capacityk,x dominates all columns of Q. Therefore, when the capacity of b isk b ,x dominates all triples (a, f, S), which shows that the matching corresponding tox is a stable matching with respect to the new capacity vectork. 
Given any triple (a
Suppose x * a,f,S = 0 whenever b∈B S b > α, then for every cost vector c the following are true.
(A): There exists a 0 − 1 vectorx such that
(B): There exists a 0 − 1 vectorx such that
Proof. See Appendix B.
Remark. Notice, thex obtained in part (B) of Lemma 3.3 satisfies an additional constraint compared to part (A): all agents in A do not consume more than (2α + 1)α − 1 units in excess of the total supply. On the other hand, for each individual b ∈ B, the bound in (13) is slightly worse than the bound in (3.1) of part (A).
Proof of Theorem 3.1 The proof follows from Lemma 3.2 and 3.3. We start from the solution x * found using Scarf's lemma.
First we assume that under x * every b ∈ B is fully allocated, that is, (a,f,S)∈Φ S b ·x * a,f,S = k b . We will round x * according to Lemma 3.3, with the following cost c: c
Letx andx be the solutions by rounding x * as in Lemma 3.3; constructk andk, respectively, according to Lemma 3.2. Because under x * every b ∈ B is fully allocated, (13) and (14). By this, Theorem 3.1 is proved.
It remains to show that Theorem 3.1 is true when not every b ∈ B is fully allocated under x * . Let B − be a subset of B in which the goods are not fully allocated, that is,
Create a set A 0 of dummy agents who are unit demand and only interested in goods in B − .
Furthermore, any b ∈ B − prefers (a, f, S) for which x * (a,f,S) > 0 to any triple containing agents in A 0 . It is straightforward to see that one can construct x 0 corresponding to a fractional assignment of B − to A 0 such that in the two sided market between A ∪ A 0 and B, x * ⊕ x 0 is a dominating vertex. 12 Furthermore, if the set of dummy agents is large enough,
13
then under x * ⊕ x 0 every b ∈ B is fully allocated.
Apply the same argument to x * ⊕ x 0 as in the previous case, in which x * allocates all goods, letk andk be the new capacity vectors. Notice that because of the above argument, k andk satisfy all the required conditions in Theorem 3.1. Letx andx be the rounded vectors of x * , that is ignore the rounded vector corresponding to x 0 . We claim thatx andx are stable with respect tok andk, respectively. This is true because x 0 only represents the 12 x * ⊕ x 0 denotes the combined vector of x * and x 0 . 13 more precisely,
assignment between B − and A 0 , thus,
By Lemma 3.2x andx are stable matching with respect tok andk, respectively.
In fact, the proof is constructive. Scarf [1967] gives a finite algorithm for identifying a dominating vertex in Lemma 3.1. Our Lemma 3.3 is established via a polynomial time algorithm. Therefore, the near feasible matches we identify can be constructed in finite time.
Optimization Based Choice Function
In this section we introduce a new class of choice functions that subsumes the responsive choice function in Section 3. The example below motivates this class. First of all, under the responsiveness assumption as in Section 3,
Now suppose these preferences corresponded to the following cardinal utilities:
If utility is additive between s 1 , s 2 , a more reasonable choice would give
The choice function consistent with utility maximization can be represented in the following way. Given a subset of candidates H ⊂ {(m, f ), s 1 , s 2 , (m, ∅), (∅, f )}, the hospital's choice, CH(H), is a subset of H and defined as {τ ∈ H : x τ = 1}, where x is the solution of the following optimization problem.
Here c τ is the number of positions needed for τ . In particular, c (m,f ) = 2, c s 1 = c s 2 = 1; and
Notice the choice function defined above does not only captures the complementarity between m and f , but also among (m, f ), s 1 and s 2 . In particular, CH({(m, f ), s 1 , s 2 }) = {s 1 , s 2 } and CH({(m, f ), s 1 }) = CH({(m, f ), s 2 }) = {(m, f )}, thus, CH(.) does not satisfy substitutablity.
14 Using the same notation as in Section 3, we define the class of optimization based choice functions for each b ∈ B. First, for a triple (a, f, S) ∈ Φ b , 15 let V b a,f,S 0 be the utility that b enjoys when a consumes {S, f }.
is defined as {(a, f, S) ∈ H|x a,f,S = 1}, where x a,f,S ∈ {0, 1} is the solution of the following problem.
If there are multiple solutions, we break ties lexicographically. Choose the first solution in a lexicographical order for a fixed linear order
It can be shown that generalized responsive preferences are a special case of optimization based choice functions. Optimization-based choice functions can encode knapsack problem, thus given H, finding CH(H) is an N P-hard problem. In the following we give a necessary condition to check if H * = CH(H), which we use later.
Recall that Φ b contains all the triples, for which the third member, S, contains at least 1 copy of the good owned by b.
Proof. Appendix A.2
We introduce a stability concept stronger than stable, but weaker than group-stable, as defined in Definition 3.2 and 3.3.
Definition 4.2 Given a feasible matching M, an agent b ∈ B and a nonempty set of triples H ⊂ Φ b are said to be a blocking coalition of M if the following conditions hold
S)}).
A feasible matching M is strongly stable if the following conditions hold:
2)[No blocking] There does not exist a blocking coalition (b, H).
Strong stability differs from stability in that considers blocking by subsets of triples.
However, unlike group-stability, the coalition of triples must share a common agent in B.
The interpretation of such coalition is that the agent b is the "initiating" blocker, and other agents b ∈ B involved with the potential deviation of agents in H are passive. Thus, strong stability allows certain joint deviations to happen, but rules out deviations more complex involving larger groups.
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Under optimization based preferences, stable matches are not necessarily strongly stable.
The example below illustrates this. 
The choice function of the hospital h 1 is defined as in example 1. Hospital 2's has generalized responsive preferences (as defined in Definition 3.4), where the preference order is Theorem 4.1 If each agent b ∈ B has an optimization based choice function and each agent a ∈ A is interested of bundles of size at most α, then for any capacity vector {k b |b ∈ B} the following is true.
• There exists a capacity vector {k b |b ∈ B} satisfying max b∈B |k b −k b | ≤ 2α − 1 and b k b ≤ bk b such that a strongly stable matching with respect tok exists.
• There exists a capacity vector {k b |b ∈ B} satisfying max b∈B |k b −k b | ≤ 2α and b k b ≤ bk b ≤ b k b + (2α + 1)α − 1 such that a strongly stable matching with respect tok exists.
Proof. We use the optimization based choice function of each b ∈ B to induce a priority ordering over Φ b for all b ∈ B. Subsequently, we invoke Scarf's lemma to obtain a fractional dominating solution x * and use the rounding Lemma 3.3 to get an approximate stable matching as in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Given (a, f, S), (a , f , S ) ∈ Φ b (therefore S b , S b > 0), we define the priority order b as follows: x a,f,S ≤ 1 for every agent a ∈ A (a,f,S)∈Φ
Scarf's lemma tells us that the linear system above has a dominating vertex x * with respect to { a , a ∈ A} and { b , b ∈ B} as defined above.
We need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 Letx be a {0, 1} vector whose support is a subset of x * 's support, i.e, x * a,f,S = 0 ⇒x a,f,S = 0, such that
If each agent in B has an optimization based choice function,x is a feasible matching with respect tok that is strongly stable. Let M be the matching corresponding tox, that is M = {(a, f, S) :x a,f,S = 1}. If M is not strongly stable, there exists a blocking coalition (b, H), where b ∈ B and non-empty
(ii) (a, f, S) a M a for all (a, f, S) ∈ H, and (iii) for all (a, f, S) ∈ H as well as
We first show that if (ii) and (iii) hold then x * dominates all triples in H at b. Now (ii) implies that x * cannot dominate (a, f, S) at a for any (a, f, S) ∈ H. This is true because if x * dominates (a, f, S) at a, then f ,S x * a,f ,S = 1 and for all x * a,f ,S > 0 :
(a, f , S ) a (a, f, S) which implies that f ,S x a,f ,S = 1, and thus ∅ = M a a (a, f, S),
Similarly, because of (iii) x * cannot dominate (a, f, S) at b for any b = b such that S b > 0.
To see why, assume not. Then, a ,f ,S ∈Φ S b · x * a ,f ,S = k b and for all x * a ,f ,S > 0, S b > 0 :
However, according to Lemma 4.1
From (17), (18), we prove that H ⊂ CH b (M b ∪ H), contradicting (i), which proves the Lemma.
Because the matching M is on the support of x * , if (18) is true then
This implies
Furthermore because of (17), and the definition ofk, we have
From (19) and (20) 
Conclusion
A key goal in the design of centralized matching markets is to eliminate the incentive for participants to contract outside of the market. This is formalized as stability and is considered crucial for the long-term sustainability of a market. In the presence of complementarities, stable matchings need not exist and limits the applicability of centralized matching. Others have responded to this challenge by weakening the notion of stability. We instead, weaken 'feasibility' and establish the existence of near feasible stable matchings in the presence of complementarities.
The first type of blocking coalition corresponds to a triple (a, f, S) where a is a single student s, f is redundant (NULL), and S is a single slot in the hospital h. We need to show that if
Now, because ch h (.) is a responsive choice function over individual doctors, s ∈ ch h (µ(h)∪ s) implies that s is among the best k h candidates among µ(h) ∪ s. Therefore, even when some other members of µ(h) form pairs they cannot improve their rank in the new * b order, because * b ranks these couples according to their worst member. Hence, the corresponding triple (a, f, S) would still be selected in the choice function, that is (a, f, S)
For the second type of blocking coalition, the proof is exactly the same as above.
In the third type of blocking coalition, the pair (f c , m c ) and a hospital h correspond to (a, f, S), where a represents the couple, S contains 2 positions in h, and f is NULL.
both f c and m c are among the k h best candidates, thus even when represented by the triple (a, f, S), both members are still ranked highly among , S) ). This shows that if (f c , m c ), h blocks a matching µ, then (a, f, S) blocks M.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
According to Definition 4.1, CH b (H) = {(a, f, S) ∈ H|x a,f,S = 1}, where x a,f,S ∈ {0, 1} is the solution of the following problem.
s.t :
It is straightforward to check that the primal solution x * and the dual (λ, β) satisfy the complementary slackness condition of the linear relaxation of (21), where we replace x a,f,S ∈ {0, 1} by 0 ≤ x a,f,S ≤ 1. Thus, x * is the optimal solution of the above optimization problem.
It remains to verify that among all optimal solutions, H * is the first according to the tie breaking rule
> β then (a, f, S) is in all optimal solutions of (21).
Second, if
< β, then (a, f, S) cannot be in any optimal solution of (21). Third, for an
B Rounding Technique
B.1 Iterative Rounding
The proof is based on a combinatorial optimization method called iterative rounding. The iterative rounding algorithm tries to identify an x ∈ arg max{c · x :
If it is integral, we are done.
If not, the iterative rounding method will eliminate one or more constraints and resolve the linear program.
The algorithm starts from a given x * ≥ 0 such that Dx * ≤ d, and executes the following steps.
Step 0: Initiate x opt := x * .
Step 1: If x opt is integral, stop and output x opt , otherwise continue to either Step 2a or 2b.
Step 2a: If any coordinate of x opt is integral, fix the value of those coordinates, and update the linear program.
To describe the updated linear program, let C and C be the set of columns of D that correspond to the non-integer and integer valued coordinates of x opt , respectively. Let D C , and D C be the sub-matrix of D that consists of columns in C and the complement C, respectively. Similarly, for a vector x, let x C and x C be the sub-vector of x that consists of all coordinates in C and C.
The updated linear program is:
In other words, we replace c by c C ;
, and move to Step 3.
Step 2b If all coordinates of x opt are fractional, then delete certain rows of D (to be specified later) and the corresponding constraints from the linear program. Update the linear program, move to Step 3.
Step 3 Solve the updated linear program {max c · x subject to Dx ≤ d} to get an extreme point solution. Let this be the new x opt and return to Step 1.
Lemma B.1 Assume that whenever the algorithm passes
Step 1 and has not terminated, it can either enter Step 2a, or will find at least one row of the current D to delete in Step 2b.
Then, the algorithm will terminate in a finite number of steps and output a 0-1 vector.
Proof. In Step 2a, we fix at least one coordinate and update the linear program, thus at least one column of the matrix is eliminated. In Step 2b, on the other hand, we delete at least one row. D is a finite matrix. Thus, the algorithm can only execute Step 2a and
Step 2b a finite number of times. Therefore, if the assumption in Lemma B.1 holds, then, the algorithm has to terminate.
Observe that after each iteration of the algorithm, we eliminate some constraints and resolve the linear program, thus the objective function cannot decrease.
To prove Lemma 3.3, given the fractional vector x * we will set up two linear programs corresponding to part A and part B of Lemma 3.3. We first show that x * is a feasible solution of each of these programs. Then, apply the iterative rounding algorithm that uses certain row elimination rules for Step 2b. We describe these rules later.
In order to show that the iterative rounding algorithm will terminate, we will need the following result.
Lemma B.2 Given nonnegative integers d a ≤d a for all a ∈ A,
x a,f,S ≤d a for all a ∈ A} is an integral polytope. That is for any c, the linear program max x∈P c · x has an integral optimal solution.
Proof. Each variable appears with a non-zero coefficient in at most one constraint. The non-zero coefficient has the value 1, making the constraint matrix totally unimodular.
B.2 Proof of part A of Lemma 3.3:
Consider the following program.
PROGRAM A: max c · x such that :
We apply the iterative rounding algorithm to this program, and start with x * at Step 0.
Clearly, x * satisfies all the constraints in PROGRAM A. Our row elimination rule we will only delete constraints of type (A2) and (A3).
Consider an intermediate step of the algorithm. Assume the current linear program is PROGRAM A': max c · x such that : 
17 Notice, because all coordinates of x opt are fractional, they are less than 1. Therefore, x opt a,f,S = 0.
Assume that Claim B.1 is true. Apply the iterative rounding algorithm with the following row elimination rule for Step 2b:
• Eliminate any constraint b of type (A2') if (a,f,S) S b · x opt a,f,S ≤d b + 2α − 1.
• Eliminate any constraint b of type (A3') if 0= (a,f,S) 
To show that with this elimination rule the algorithm will terminate, notice that if no constraints of type (A2') or (A3') remain, according to Lemma B.2, the linear program has an integral solution, and thus the algorithm terminates at Step 1. Assume the algorithm does not terminates at Step 1. Because of Claim B.2, we can always proceed either to Step 2a or 2b. Thus according to Lemma B.1 the algorithm has to end in a finite number of steps.
Letx be the output of this algorithm. We show thatx satisfies (6)-(3.1).
Once coordinate x a,f,S is fixed, it is never changed in subsequent iterations. Thus, (6) is true because if x * a,f,S = 0, then that variable is fixed to be 0 in all subsequent iterations of the algorithm.
Because of Lemma B.1, c ·x ≥ c · x * , thus (7) is true.
(8) is not violated because we do not eliminate such constraints during the algorithm.
Finally we need to show (3.1) , that is
Notice that the constraints that were eliminated during the execution of the algorithm satisfy the conditions in Claim B.1, and once coordinate x a,f,S is fixed, it is never changed in subsequent iterations. Therefore, the above inequalities must hold.
Asx satisfies (6)-(3.1), this suffices to prove part A of Lemma 3.3.
It remains to prove Claim B.1.
Proof of Claim B.1 This proof is an extension of Király et al. [2012] .
18 Given the extreme point x opt , assume none its coordinates are integral, i.e, 0 < x opt a,f,S < 1. We credit each non-zero variable x opt a,f,S with a single token. We then redistribute these tokens to the binding, linearly independent constraints in a particular way.
Suppose for a contradiction that the conclusion of Claim B.1 is false. Because all d b ,d b are integral, the contracdiction assumption means that for all b:
We show that each binding constraint will get at least one token, and there will be one token left over. This shows that the number of non-zero variables in x opt exceeds the number of binding, linearly independent constraints, which contradicts the fact that x opt is an extreme point.
We redistribute the tokens as follows:
1. Credit 1/2 of the tokens of x opt a,f,S to the constraint corresponding to agent a (A1').
Credit
] to each constraint of type (A2') corresponding to each b ∈ B .
] to each constraint of type (A3') corresponding to each b ∈ B .
Notice that this is feasible because the size of each bundle is at most α. The total of number of tokens debited from each x opt a,f,S is
Consider an agent a such that (f,S) x opt a,f,S = 1. As all components of x opt a,f,S are fractional, there are at least 2 positive x opt a,f,S . Each of them contributes 1/2 a token, thus, the constraint corresponding to agent a gets at least 1 token.
Consider an agent b ∈ B and suppose its corresponding constraint of type (A3') binds.
Then, the number of tokens it gets is a,f,S
Because of the contradiction assumption, d b ≥ 2α, this constraint gets at least 1 token.
Now suppose a constraint of type (A2') for agent b ∈ B binds. Then, the number of tokens it gets is a,f,S
As assumed, (a,f,S) S b · x opt a,f,S ≥d b + 2α, this constraint gets at least 1 token. Hence, the amount of tokens given at the beginning (which is the dimension of x opt ) have been redistributed to the binding constraints, so that each is credited with at least 1 token.
Thus the dimension of x opt is at least the number of binding constraints. Now, equality obtains only if for every nonzero x opt a,f,S , size(S) = α. Furthermore, the constraint corresponding to agent a as well as all constraints corresponding to all b ∈ B bind.
In this case one can show that the set of binding constraints is not linearly independent. To see this, consider the sum of all the binding constraints of type (A1'). The coefficient of each variable will be 1. On the other hand, in the sum of all the constraints of type (A2'), the coefficient of each variable x a,f,S > 0 is size(S). However, each bundle consumed contains exactly α items. Thus each coefficient is α.
By this we have shown that the number of nonzero variables in an extreme point solution is larger than the number of linearly independent binding constraints.
B.3 Proof of part B of Lemma 3.3
The proof of part B is similar to the previous proof of part A.
PROGRAM B: max c · x such that :
(a,f,S)
Clearly, x * satisfies all the constraints in PROGRAM B. In the row elimination rule we will only delete the constraints of type (B1), (B2) and (B3).
Consider or one without constraint (B3'). 19 Without loss of generality, we assume that the current linear program has such a constraint, otherwise the proof is the same as in part A.
As in the proof of part A, H corresponds to the set of active columns; B ∪B corresponds to the set of remaining constraints of type (B1) and (B2).
Again, we assume x opt to be the optimal solution of the PROGRAM B' and all the coordinates of x opt are fractional, that is, 0 < x opt < 1. With this we have the following. to each constraint of type (B3').
It is easy to check that the sum of these tokens is at most 1, because for every S, size(S) = b S b ≤ α. Combining these inequalities, we obtain that the constraint corresponding to agent a also gets at least one token. The remainder of the proof shows if all the inequalities above hold at equality, then these binding constraints are linearly dependent as in the the proof of Claim B.1.
